Six Flags Over Georgia Goliath Incident (12-Oct-2026)

[dontbesuchamcbr]

But how does that all make sense in the timeline?
11 hours after the incident Silverstar opened and everybody here wants to belive that was because B&M knows that nothing is wrong with their clamshells and told EP emediately. EP was a one time customers of B&M and will most likely never ever buy a coaster again from them. Not because they are bad, but because since back then, they can build their own thrill coasters.

Meanwhile they forgot to tell one of their biggest customers, that are still buying a lot of B&M coasters, that Marco is perfectly safe? At least Universial received that message after a couple of days, Hershey too. Yeah sure, that makes total sense.

Edit: In Florida it could be a PR nightmare to reopen the same coaster model, but not in Pennsylvania?

 

[Matt N]

But how does that all make sense in the timeline?
11 hours after the incident Silverstar opened and everybody here wants to belive that was because B&M knows that nothing is wrong with their clamshells and told EP emediately. EP was a one time customers of B&M and will most likely never ever buy a coaster again from them. Not because they are bad, but because since back then, they can build their own thrill coasters.

Meanwhile they forgot to tell one of their biggest customers, that are still buying a lot of B&M coasters, that Marco is perfectly safe? At least Universial received that message after a couple of days, Hershey too. Yeah sure, that makes total sense.

They may all have been told, but different parks may have reacted to it differently. We don’t know anything about the communications B&M have or haven’t had with the parks that operate B&M Hyper Coasters.

As I said, the parks in North America are in a much more sensitive zone PR-wise than the parks in Europe and Asia by virtue of the incident itself occurring in North America. Mako is not that far from Georgia, and if they are seen to reopen it rashly, the US news outlets could very well pick up on it and write hit pieces on how “ride that is the same as death coaster in Georgia reopens just a day after deadly incident”. Whereas I doubt the Germans, Spanish and Japanese are as concerned about a roller coaster accident in North America and are less concerned about what US news outlets could write about them as ultimately, the chances of demographic overlap between those reading US news outlets and those visiting European and Asian theme parks is probably pretty small outside of enthusiast circles.

The other thing to consider is that B&M may have made a recommendation to the parks involving checking certain components. Europa Park and PortAventura may have checked this recently enough to be unconcerned, while other parks might have checked this longer ago and need a little more time.

 

[dontbesuchamcbr]

Pennsylvania is also in North America and they don't care about any PR disaster?
And a lot of asumptions must be true at the same time, for this to make any sense.

 

[Bowser]

It’s worth remembering in this debate that Hollywood Dream, which initially closed, has also now reopened and doesn’t have seatbelts. While nothing is confirmed and we should keep an open mind, that possibly provides our strongest proof yet that B&M does not believe the clamshells themselves were an issue.

Surely if B&M suspected that there was even the slightest whiff of an inherent issue with the clamshells, they would have recalled all clamshell coasters worldwide and told them all to shut? Manufacturers have recalled all examples of a model before in considerably less dire circumstances, and there’s no way that B&M would tolerate even the slightest chance of there being an inherent safety issue on operating coasters if there was one. That leads me to believe that they likely think the inherent clamshell design is fine.

As for why Mako and the like have remained closed, different US states probably differ in their safety approaches, and I also imagine the fact that Mako and the like are in the USA possibly contributes to their continued closure. I feel like news outlets and such may make a quicker link to the incident in America itself than outside of it, and no park wants a PR nightmare as a result of an incident that didn’t happen at their park regardless of how safe the ride may actually be. I think the link will be much, much more easily made in the USA than outside of it, hence the USA parks need to handle opening/reopening potentially more delicately than those in Europe and Asia.

Hollywood Dream also remained open the day after the accident. With the time difference of course there could have been a delay in the story reaching Japan and the ride did close early at approximately 530pm that day.

I'm not really buying into the narrative being suggested that Europa Park are making safety decisions based on arrogance. The fact of the matter is the park has an impeccable safety record with to my knowledge no passenger fatalities in their history. They are the gold standard of high maintenance and operations.

The same simply cannot be said of Six Flags and that's not to attribute blame at this point in time but to share an understanding of Europa's confidence in maintaining their safety record. Not sure if it was shared in here but they did give a brief public statement at the time:

We did not need to take any measures and were able to put Silver Star into operation as usual this morning ," a spokesperson told Looopings.

 

[CloudRuben]

Isn't it true that they are one of the few parks to make a statement on the issue, especially outside the US? Was there any word from Port Aventura?
I agree you can interpret it as arrogant, or confident, but other parks kept their rides open as well. I understand that we focus on Europa Park, but it might be a little unfair to single them out.

 

[dontbesuchamcbr]

OK, I didn't know that Universial had their Coaster open until 5:30 PM that day!

Can someone please explain to me how B&M knew within the first hours, that everything was alright with their restraints, called every Park with a B&M Hyper Coaster and EP opened SS on 9am and only 90 minutes later Universial closed their B&M Hyper Coaster, although they also knew by then, that everything is OK?

And how did B&M know what was going on in such a short time? Were they there? Is it normal that the US authorities let a third party check an accident site in the first hours, before they are done with their own investigation?

Or did SF tell them officialy that it was their fault, because they f*ed up? Because thats the first thing a company does, to damit, that it was all their fault?

All of that makes absolutely no sense.

 

[jasone]

OK, I didn't know that Universial had their Coaster open until 5:30 PM that day!

Can someone please explain to me how B&M knew within the first hours, that everything was alright with their restraints, called every Park with a B&M Hyper Coaster and EP opened SS on 9am and only 90 minutes later Universial closed their B&M Hyper Coaster, although they also knew by then, that everything is OK?

And how did B&M know what was going on in such a short time? Were they there? Is it normal that the US authorities let a third party check an accident site in the first hours, before they are done with their own investigation?

Or did SF tell them officialy that it was their fault, because they f*ed up? Because thats the first thing a company does, to damit, that it was all their fault?

All of that makes absolutely no sense.

We will never know any of these things. But you’re acting like world class parks and manufacturers know nothing about their field and act recklessly. All we’re saying is, we imagine they have some information that makes them confident enough that silver star is no more of a risk than it was prior to this tragedy. Just like the other parks that are opening their B&M hypers. Otherwise they’d be unlikely to take that risk.

Further information is unlikely to be released just yet as it’s an active investigation and there is likely to be litigation. It doesn’t stop parks and manufacturers making decisions behind the scenes with information that they may know, that we don’t.

 

[Nicky Borrill]

It’s worth remembering in this debate that Hollywood Dream, which initially closed, has also now reopened and doesn’t have seatbelts. While nothing is confirmed and we should keep an open mind, that possibly provides our strongest proof yet that B&M does not believe the clamshells themselves were an issue.

Surely if B&M suspected that there was even the slightest whiff of an inherent issue with the clamshells, they would have recalled all clamshell coasters worldwide and told them all to shut? Manufacturers have recalled all examples of a model before in considerably less dire circumstances, and there’s no way that B&M would tolerate even the slightest chance of there being an inherent safety issue on operating coasters if there was one. That leads me to believe that they likely think the inherent clamshell design is fine.

As for why Mako and the like have remained closed, different US states probably differ in their safety approaches, and I also imagine the fact that Mako and the like are in the USA possibly contributes to their continued closure. I feel like news outlets and such may make a quicker link to the incident in America itself than outside of it, and no park wants a PR nightmare as a result of an incident that didn’t happen at their park regardless of how safe the ride may actually be. I think the link will be much, much more easily made in the USA than outside of it, hence the USA parks need to handle opening/reopening potentially more delicately than those in Europe and Asia.

Just because this is looking like there may well have been some kind of mechanical failure of the restraint system, it does not, and has never, necessarily meant that there is something inherently wrong with the clamshell design... In fact, after more than 2 and a half decades of flawless service, it's very unlikely that there is something wrong with the design...

 

[JoshC.]

I'm not really buying into the narrative being suggested that Europa Park are making safety decisions based on arrogance. The fact of the matter is the park has an impeccable safety record with to my knowledge no passenger fatalities in their history. They are the gold standard of high maintenance and operations.

Europa just like setting fire to their rides instead.

 

[Intamin to Win]

Has it been confirmed that the victim indeed passed out mid-ride, and thus was leaning onto the restraint for a lot of the ride’s run time?

I wonder if sustained pressure + the regular ride G forces could have caused each locking pawl to slip. One at a time. This assumes there is excessive wear and tear on the parts in question, as well.

 

[Lucky_3838]

Hi everyone,

I'm new to the forum and joined specifically to share a personal project that turned into a much deeper rabbit hole than I expected: a 54-page illustrated study of the B&M clamshell lap restraint. I've spent far too many hours on it, and thought it might interest people here who enjoy the engineering behind the rides.

When I visit a park, I tend to think about the forces, mechanisms, launch systems and controls behind whatever I'm riding. I like B&M a lot, and I'd wanted to understand exactly what happens inside this restraint when we hear those familiar clicks. Once I had enough drawing captures and photographs, I started reconstructing the internal components in CAD.

Then I wanted the section through the other side. Then every discrete locking position. Then the release linkage. And eventually: where do the forces go, which components carry them, and what loads might the reconstructed assembly support under stated assumptions?

That last question took rather more work than drawing a few arrows.

The document brings together:

• My CAD reconstruction of both sides, with component identification and part-number references where available.
• The closing sequences, pawl engagement and release mechanism, illustrated with detailed figures.
• Contact geometry, internal reactions, selected stress checks and conditional load estimates, including how the two locking sides might share load.

CAD reconstruction of sections A–A and B–B, showing opposite sides of the restraint arm and the locking and release components.​

I couldn't find another public study of this particular mechanism that brought all of those elements together. Making that reconstruction and analysis available in one self-contained document is the main reason I'm sharing it.

One detail I particularly enjoyed reconstructing is the staggered sequence of clicks between the two sides. The occupied closing position depends on the rider, so the analysis considers different closure positions and active pawls rather than assigning one position to everyone.

For a sense of the results, one reference scenario gives first nominal stress thresholds of approximately 4.66 kN upward and 5.03 kN forward, applied separately at the idealised pad contact position. Both are governed by a sampled pawl section. These are conditional model results, not measured breaking loads or a maximum passenger weight: the actual material grades, some dimensions and several connection details remain unverified. The assumptions and limitations are set out in the document.

Working through how the locking and release functions fit together has increased my appreciation for this compact mechanism. I hope the drawings make it enjoyable to explore, even for readers who prefer to skip the equations.

For context, I'm a university lecturer and researcher in applied physics, with an engineering background and a PhD. This is a personal project outside my professional specialism.

I'd wanted to study the mechanism before the recent accident; material shared afterwards, particularly the drawing captures shown by Ryan The Ride Mechanic, helped make the reconstruction possible. This work is independent of B&M and does not investigate the accident or its cause. Source credits, including material credited in Ryan's video to @Crazybird199, are included in the paper.

You can read or download the full 54-page study on GitHub. The figure above gives a preview of the reconstruction; the PDF contains the complete analysis, figures, references and limitations.

Specific corrections or additional documented information about the mechanism are very welcome.

 

[Nicky Borrill]

Has it been confirmed that the victim indeed passed out mid-ride, and thus was leaning onto the restraint for a lot of the ride’s run time?

I wonder if sustained pressure + the regular ride G forces could have caused each locking pawl to slip. One at a time. This assumes there is excessive wear and tear on the parts in question, as well.

No, far from confirmed... But the witness who has repeatedly given that statement seems reasonably reliable, it was the 13 year old relative sat next to the gent.

 

[Hixee]

Hi everyone,

I'm new to the forum and joined specifically to share a personal project that turned into a much deeper rabbit hole than I expected: a 54-page illustrated study of the B&M clamshell lap restraint. I've spent far too many hours on it, and thought it might interest people here who enjoy the engineering behind the rides.

When I visit a park, I tend to think about the forces, mechanisms, launch systems and controls behind whatever I'm riding. I like B&M a lot, and I'd wanted to understand exactly what happens inside this restraint when we hear those familiar clicks. Once I had enough drawing captures and photographs, I started reconstructing the internal components in CAD.

Then I wanted the section through the other side. Then every discrete locking position. Then the release linkage. And eventually: where do the forces go, which components carry them, and what loads might the reconstructed assembly support under stated assumptions?

That last question took rather more work than drawing a few arrows.

The document brings together:

• My CAD reconstruction of both sides, with component identification and part-number references where available.
• The closing sequences, pawl engagement and release mechanism, illustrated with detailed figures.
• Contact geometry, internal reactions, selected stress checks and conditional load estimates, including how the two locking sides might share load.

View attachment 43531

CAD reconstruction of sections A–A and B–B, showing opposite sides of the restraint arm and the locking and release components.​

I couldn't find another public study of this particular mechanism that brought all of those elements together. Making that reconstruction and analysis available in one self-contained document is the main reason I'm sharing it.

One detail I particularly enjoyed reconstructing is the staggered sequence of clicks between the two sides. The occupied closing position depends on the rider, so the analysis considers different closure positions and active pawls rather than assigning one position to everyone.

For a sense of the results, one reference scenario gives first nominal stress thresholds of approximately 4.66 kN upward and 5.03 kN forward, applied separately at the idealised pad contact position. Both are governed by a sampled pawl section. These are conditional model results, not measured breaking loads or a maximum passenger weight: the actual material grades, some dimensions and several connection details remain unverified. The assumptions and limitations are set out in the document.

Working through how the locking and release functions fit together has increased my appreciation for this compact mechanism. I hope the drawings make it enjoyable to explore, even for readers who prefer to skip the equations.

For context, I'm a university lecturer and researcher in applied physics, with an engineering background and a PhD. This is a personal project outside my professional specialism.

I'd wanted to study the mechanism before the recent accident; material shared afterwards, particularly the drawing captures shown by Ryan The Ride Mechanic, helped make the reconstruction possible. This work is independent of B&M and does not investigate the accident or its cause. Source credits, including material credited in Ryan's video to @Crazybird199, are included in the paper.

You can read or download the full 54-page study on GitHub. The figure above gives a preview of the reconstruction; the PDF contains the complete analysis, figures, references and limitations.

Specific corrections or additional documented information about the mechanism are very welcome.

Moderator note - this was started as it's own thread in General Discussions, but I have moved this over into this thead to keep the discussion (/speculation?) in one place.

 

[Nicky Borrill]

CAD reconstruction of sections A–A and B–B, showing opposite sides of the restraint arm and the locking and release components.​

For a sense of the results, one reference scenario gives first nominal stress thresholds of approximately 4.66 kN upward and 5.03 kN forward, applied separately at the idealised pad contact position. Both are governed by a sampled pawl section. These are conditional model results, not measured breaking loads or a maximum passenger weight: the actual material grades, some dimensions and several connection details remain unverified. The assumptions and limitations are set out in the document.

Wow, this is some incredible detailed work. Well done.

I know you have caveated the calculations, but 4.66 kN seems way lower than what I expected... That's the gravitational equivalent of just 475kg right?

 

[Lucky_3838]

Wow, this is some incredible detailed work. Well done.

I know you have caveated the calculations, but 4.66 kN seems way lower than what I expected... That's the gravitational equivalent of just 475kg right?

Thank you! I think I went a little too far down the rabbit hole

And yes, approximately 475 kgf is right. I can see why that looks modest.

The important distinction is what the 4.66 kN represents: the external upward force at the pad at which the calculated nominal stress in one sampled pawl section reaches an assumed yield strength of 355 MPa. It isn't a prediction of the load that would break or open the actual restraint. The internal contact forces are also different from that external pad force, because of the mechanism's leverage.

Load sharing matters here too. In that particular reference scenario, side B reaches its criterion just as side A begins to engage, so the result isn't the sum of two independently established locking-side capacities.

For scale, I included −2g as a demanding hypothetical comparison, not as a typical B&M Hyper airtime value or a verified maximum. I don't have a validated seat-level acceleration history for these rides. I'm hoping to collect my own three-axis accelerometer and gyroscope recordings on Shambhala using phyphox, ideally at 100 Hz or higher .

Using the paper's specific-force convention and assigning the entire vertical component to the restraint, a 150 kg rider gives approximately 0.74 kN at −0.5g, 1.47 kN at −1g, and 2.94 kN at −2g.

That last demand remains below the 4.66 kN reference criterion, although their ratio of about 1.58 isn't a verified safety factor. These examples illustrate the force scale rather than establish an operating limit.

Actual material properties and load sharing could change the result substantially. Some assumptions may underestimate a particular resistance, while omitted failure modes could work the other way. I'd therefore describe it as a conditional model result, rather than a demonstrated conservative estimate of the real assembly's strength.

 

[Nicky Borrill]

Thank you! I think I went a little too far down the rabbit hole

And yes, approximately 475 kgf is right. I can see why that looks modest.

The important distinction is what the 4.66 kN represents: the external upward force at the pad at which the calculated nominal stress in one sampled pawl section reaches an assumed yield strength of 355 MPa. It isn't a prediction of the load that would break or open the actual restraint. The internal contact forces are also different from that external pad force, because of the mechanism's leverage.

Load sharing matters here too. In that particular reference scenario, side B reaches its criterion just as side A begins to engage, so the result isn't the sum of two independently established locking-side capacities.

For scale, I included −2g as a demanding hypothetical comparison, not as a typical B&M Hyper airtime value or a verified maximum. I don't have a validated seat-level acceleration history for these rides. I'm hoping to collect my own three-axis accelerometer and gyroscope recordings on Shambhala using phyphox, ideally at 100 Hz or higher .

Using the paper's specific-force convention and assigning the entire vertical component to the restraint, a 150 kg rider gives approximately 0.74 kN at −0.5g, 1.47 kN at −1g, and 2.94 kN at −2g.

That last demand remains below the 4.66 kN reference criterion, although their ratio of about 1.58 isn't a verified safety factor. These examples illustrate the force scale rather than establish an operating limit.

Actual material properties and load sharing could change the result substantially. Some assumptions may underestimate a particular resistance, while omitted failure modes could work the other way. I'd therefore describe it as a conditional model result, rather than a demonstrated conservative estimate of the real assembly's strength.

150kg is probably bigger than the restraints can physically lock at for most builds and body types. (I'm 6' 3" and I had issues with some at around 115kg.)

You may have already seen it, but I wonder if this channel is of any help to you... https://www.youtube.com/@CoasterStats/videos

 

[Lucky_3838]

150kg is probably bigger than the restraints can physically lock at for most builds and body types. (I'm 6' 3" and I had issues with some at around 115kg.)

You may have already seen it, but I wonder if this channel is of any help to you... https://www.youtube.com/@CoasterStats/videos

Yeah, fair point about body shape. The 150 kg was just a heavier example to run through the calculation, rather than an estimate of who could actually fit.

I'm about 6'2" and 108 kg myself, with fairly substantial thighs. I could get the bar closed fine, but getting it snug against my legs with no remaining gap meant giving it a proper pull into the next click . So I can definitely see how people of similar weight could have quite different experiences with the fit.

And thanks for the channel recommendation! I've had a look at their Mako recording. The displayed vertical minimum is about −0.85g; the −1.50g minimum is longitudinal. That's useful context for the −2g comparison, which I meant as a demanding hypothetical case, rather than a typical B&M Hyper airtime value.

Those big positive vertical peaks, around +3.7g, would mainly be the seat taking the load. At the bottom of a hill, the seat supplies the upward force needed to make your body follow the curved path. That doesn't mean 3.7 times your body weight is trying to pull the lap bar open.

The bar can still carry load while you're pressed into the seat, particularly during braking. You can push forwards against the pad, and depending on the contact geometry, that can also produce an upward force on the bar.

For a straightforward comparison, the 4.66 kN upward model threshold corresponds to twice body weight for someone weighing about 238 kg. That's simply a force comparison under the calculation's assumptions. It doesn't establish a passenger weight limit or predict when the actual assembly would break.

I'm working through the combined upward and forward loads now, including how they change with the closing position and how the seat and pad share the load during braking. These recordings should help me choose more realistic cases. I need to see which loads actually happen together, because combining the biggest number from each axis could give me a case that never occurs during the ride.

I'd like to add that comparison in the next update. Apparently I haven't quite finished with this rabbit hole yet .

 

[Matt N]

It’s probably worth us noting that no B&M Hyper likely goes above -1G in terms of negative g-forces, and if anything probably stays below, so if I’m crudely understanding (not an engineer by any stretch, but did do A Level Physics), a rider would likely have to weigh more than 475kg to break the restraint if the ride never actually hits -1G at its negative g-force peak, and the closer to pure 0G the ride’s maximum negative g peak lies, the greater the weight required to break the restraint is. I’m inclined to believe that most B&M Hypers, particularly older ones like Goliath, stay pretty close to the 0G mark, as B&Ms are more known for sustained floater airtime as opposed to the aggressive forced ejector airtime found on Intamins, RMCs and the like.

A kilo is around 2.2lbs, if the internet is to be believed, which would put that likely weight minimum at ~1,045lb. So even for pretty tall humans, a person would have to be morbidly, morbidly obese, probably bordering on hitting the record books, to even come close to breaking a B&M restraint. So much so that their physical size and girth would likely present an issue with actually fitting into the ride long before their weight would threaten to break the restraint.

Am I understanding correctly? As I say, I’m not an engineer by any means, so please correct me if I’m spouting rubbish!

 

[Nicky Borrill]

Posting this video as further evidence to those that doubted it that there should be little to no gap between the restraint and seat's lateral supports... This video shows (screenshotted below) a restraint on the same coaster that has been allowed to operate beyond safe conditions, (no yellow line visible) and yet still, there's very little gap between restraint and seat...

This is the evidence that the restraint is not in a safe condition, and the train has been allowed to dispatch despite that... There should be a visual check line on the ratchet cover, as seen on the other restraints... To be clear, this is the same coaster, but not during the accident ride.



And this is what that unsafe restraint looks like...



The video these screens are from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7p0YeJOz54

This suggests two things...

1) There have been times in the past where a train on the very same coaster was sent with a restraint in an unsafe condition... Indicating that in the past, the proximity sensors have either given false positives, or were calibrated incorrectly.

2) For those who still had their doubts, the restraint in the accident ORP was absolutely wide open.

To be very very clear, at the risk of repeating myself... This is NOT evidence that the restraint was sent in an unsafe condition during the accident ride, it is merely evidence that it is possible for that to happen, and that in fact, it has happened in the past... It's also further evidence, if any was needed, that the restraint was open and not in a safe locked condition in that ORP.

 

[bratcurry]

So even for pretty tall humans, a person would have to be morbidly, morbidly obese, probably bordering on hitting the record books, to even come close to breaking a B&M restraint. So much so that their physical size and girth would likely present an issue with actually fitting into the ride long before their weight would threaten to break the restraint. Am I understanding correctly?

I do believe so. That analysis is quite something to read through and I don't understand half of it. Yet there are multiple single breaking points remaining in the design of the restraints with the bar being the main one. We've never thought that track supports wouldn't be thicc enough to withstand absolutely everything that may happen to them during the lifetime of a coaster and yet there's been two broken support columns at Fury. So I'm still not ruling out an unidentified critical failure of the restraint although it's becoming more and more unlikely the more info we get.